Drawing upon the examples of Bulgaria and Hungary, this 
Labour relations, collective bargaining and employee voice in SMEs in central and eastern Europe
practices. The paper then (4) provides examples of employee representation in several sectors of the economy and (5) makes a num ber of recom m endations to policy-makers and the trade unions in the region.
The rise of the SME sector in the post-socialist economies
In the context of the socio-economic transform ation, the development of the SME sec tor in CEECs is regarded as an im portant condition for economic growth and the cre ation of employment. Throughout the region SMEs grew continuously throughout the 1990s, both in absolute numbers and in their im portance for employment, production, value added and exports (Eurostat 2003) . Their development took place in an environ ment of institutional support and public policies that were not concerned with the type of employment generated in small businesses. The fundamental liberalisation of eco nomic life, the de-monopolisation of enterprises and the emergence of autonom ous social and economic actors in the post-socialist period influenced organisational struc tures. All these processes were accompanied by the establishment of a new system of industrial relations, which is examined in the second part of this article. Economic restructuring and fast growing unemployment forced large groups of the population to look to the emerging SME sector for their economic survival.2
In the social sciences, the early 1990s saw a num ber of studies of the so-called 'transfor mation economies', which enriched the literature on the political, economic and social changes that were taking place in CEECs. During this decade, the theoretical concept of 'path-dependency' helped social scientists refute the view of change as occurring with in an 'institutional vacuum', a view which overlooked the im portance of the varied socio economic and cultural histories of these countries. As Chavance (1995: 288) has stated; 'the path-dependent emergence of a new, post-socialist form of capitalism calls for a complex evolutionary interpretation of this great transform ation, as opposed to the "big bang" view which, as the m etaphor itself suggests, overlooks the historical legacy'. The 'path-dependency' approach provides a better understanding of the variety of develop ment trajectories in the post-socialist economies in the CEE region and highlights the evolutionary character of social-economic and technological development. The explana tory strength of this approach was helpful in understanding the 'destruction' of the statesocialist political and economic regime, together with the 'reconstruction' of the market economy and the democratic political institutions in the post-socialist economies. This view enables us to understand the uneven development of the post-socialist firms and their management. Thus privatisation, market competition and foreign direct invest ment (FDI) were the main drivers of economic development and modernisation in the CEECs, but 'social filters' (the labour relations system, educational and training instit utions and regional development agencies) also played a significant role, as it was through these that the various social actors (owners, managers, the state, workers and their representative associations) experienced and 'digested' the changes.
However, none of the above-m entioned approaches would appear sufficient on their own to explain the factors triggering the spectacular growth of the SME sector in the post-socialist societies in term s of employment. The non-enforcem ent of legislation cov ering employment and employment representation must also be taken into account.
In Bulgaria, a review of the available data illustrates the spectacular growth of In Hungary, the fundam ental changes in ownership within the economy, from the end of the 1980s, also significantly influenced the organisational morphology of the country. As a result, the num ber of registered businesses doubled between 1990 and 1995 and reached 1 million by 1995. The num ber of registered enterprises, approximately 400 000 in 1990, grew by more than two and a half in a decade. The overwhelming majority (95%) were based upon self-employment, and these doubled in num ber by the mid1990s, but then fell back somewhat due to recession and unfavourable regulations. Today, 75.5% of the 1.1 million registered companies are actually in operation.
SME characteristics
Comparing the growth of the SME sectors in CEECs, using the examples of Bulgaria and Hungary, we can draw some general conclusions. A fter 1989 employment patterns changed significantly. The share of employment in SMEs started from almost zero in Bulgaria. In both countries this share has grown continuously over the last 15 years.
However, it seems that the role of SMEs in employment generation and in economic perform ance was realised later in Bulgaria than in Hungary. In the former, SMEs for a long time could only partially absorb the outflows from the labour market, as a result of the liquidation of large enterprises and economic restructuring (Beleva 2001 SMEs developed the ability to generate informal mechanisms for coping with the tur bulent institutional environment of the post-socialist economies. They relied extensive ly on flexible practices -such as keeping two sets of books and a combination of formal and informal5 employment contracts -and this had a major impact on the labour m ar ket and employment relations in both the Bulgarian and Hungarian economies. In addi tion, it is worth noting the significant differences in the innovation rate by size in the CEECs. As the size of the firm increases the innovation activity within the firm becomes m ore intensive. A similar pattern of innovation activity can be observed in the EU-15 countries (see Palmieri, in this issue); however, in the latter the size of the firm where the impact can be observed is smaller.
Labour relations and collective bargaining in the CEE region -examples from Bulgaria and Hungary
The present labour relations system in CEECs was established in the early 1990s, after the collapse of the state socialist political and economic regimes. 
Trade unions
Whereas at the beginning of the transform ation process trade union density rates in the former socialist countries were extremely high, due to compulsory membership, from 1990 onwards union membership in all CEECs experienced a dram atic decline. shows, however, that, within the CEECs, there are substantial differences between countries often considered as homogenous. In 2002 the highest unionisation rate was registered in Slovenia (41.0%) and the lowest rate was found in Poland (14.7%) in spite of the legacy of a strong and m ilitant trade union movement symbolised by the Solidarity trade union.
In addition, union density rates vary substantially between private and public sectors. For example in Hungary, Poland and Slovakia m ore than every second union member works in the public sector. The higher density rates in the public sector are explained partly by the institutional heritage of the post-socialist countries which became EU members (on 1 May 2004) and by the difficulties trade unions have in recruiting mem bers in the private sector, especially in SMEs and newly established firms (i.e. firms cre ated in the form of 'greenfield' investments in the so-called 'trade union free zones') (Mako and Novoszath 1995) .
Trade union representation is more fragm ented in Hungary, where seven trade union confederations were created after the collapse of the state socialist system, than in Bulgaria where two confederations have cooperated well since 1995. In Hungary labour relations have a dual character; as well as the historical representation of workers' inter ests by trade unions, works councils facilitate employee participation in the companies' decision-making system. However, these two channels of labour relations are interrelat 
Employers' organisations
Employers' organisations are similarly fragm ented in both countries. In Hungary there are nine employers' organisations at national level, four of which represent the interests of SMEs. In Bulgaria four of six nationally representative organisations of employers represent the interests of SMEs (either exclusively or as part of their representing a range of enterprises). Employers' organisations cover a minority of the businesses in the country (according to national statistics, in 2003, 15% of companies were members of employers' associations). They are relatively weak in term s of human and financial resources as well as services provided to their members.
Labour legislation
Both Hungary and Bulgaria im plemented new labour codes (Hungary in 1992 and Bulgaria in 1993) providing a legislative framework for labour relations. However, the logic of the new labour codes reflects the employment practices of the large firms, which dom inated the form er state socialist political and economic regimes. These labour codes do not reflect the multiplicity of employment relations within the SME sector: in par ticular, the coexistence of formal and informal regulation and the dominance of indi vidual bargaining.
Collective bargaining
In the CEECs under examination, as elsewhere in Europe, there is a clear relationship between the size of the firms and collective bargaining coverage. Table 3 shows the only statistical data available on the relationship between the size of the firm and collective agreement coverage in Hungary (there are no corresponding data for Bulgaria), which illustrate the weak role of collective bargaining within the SME sector. 
Employee voice and representation in the Bulgarian and Hungarian SMEs -case study evidence from the SMALL project
Prior to the SMALL project there was little information on employment relations and employee voice in the emerging small businesses of the CEECs. The interest of researchers often lay with the emergence of the entrepreneurs themselves rather than the experience of employees. For many observers of the post-socialist countries during the early 1990s it was clear that the working conditions in the emerging SMEs were dif ferent from those in large enterprises, but this was interpreted as a 'tem porary phe nom enon', which would pass with the development of the m arket economy. Over the last decade it has becam e evident that the nature of employment in SMEs was a fixed and not a tem porary phenom enon. Examination of violations of social and even human rights (KNSB 2000) in SMEs has taken place largely on the basis of media reports rather than more in-depth research within SMEs.
Employment relations: the combination of formal and informal practices
The case studies of SMEs in Bulgaria and Hungary include three based in the inform ation and communications technology (ICT) sector (two from Bulgaria and one from Hungary); two in the clothing sector (one from each country); three from the hotel and catering sector (two from Bulgaria and one from Hungary); two Bulgarian case studies of very small retailers; one Hungarian study based in personal services and one study of a Bulgarian industrial subcontractor. Seven of the 12 cases were at or around the micro level (under ten employees); one was small (under 50) and four medium-sized (50-249). For Bulgaria, two of the case studies, one hotel and another ICT company, were direct ly foreign-owned (by G reek and Belgian interests) and there was a minority foreign owner in another ICT company.
On the basis of the case studies conducted by the SMALL project we argue that social relations in these SMEs cannot be characterised as unregulated or as dom inated by the type of paternalist relations considered characteristic of family-run businesses. The fact that in the majority of these enterprises there was no union representation or workers' councils does not m ean that employment relations reflect the operation of unfettered owners' and management prerogatives. Despite the lack of formal regulation in the firms that were studied, there were processes of adjustm ent and adaptation which will be discussed below.
The reality of social relations in SMEs in CEECs reflects a num ber of factors. Small and micro firms tend to be less 'visible' and less subject to regulation by the authorities, as a result of their 'passive voice' strategy of 'evasion' (Stoeva 2005) .7 Informal employment relations and other non-institutional practices are typical examples of such a strategy. Often small firms have 'closed' recruitm ent practices based upon friendship and family. SMEs rarely cooperate in business associations8 and they may be reluctant to enter into relations with the state administration, which is supposed to encourage them. This behaviour is motivated by 'self-protection' and is associated with a lack of trust in the state and its institutions. Micro and small firms seem to draw back from the institution alised formal m arket relations' mechanisms, including with regard to labour relations.
As has already been mentioned, this means that often there are im portant differences between legislation and practice. For example, in the case of a small Bulgarian retailer the m anager stated his view that it was impossible fully to apply existing health and safe ty legislation in the field of small firms (in this case a small shop) -in his opinion the law should be applied only in large production enterprises. Within most of the case studies employees under contract coexisted with workers whose status was unclear (for exam ple, probation was on the basis of verbal agreem ent or they had no formal contract).
In the case of both pay and working time, actual conditions in SMEs often did not cor respond to the strict stipulations of legislation or the individual labour contract. Often employees were unfamiliar with the content of their labour contract, not because they did not have a copy of it, but more likely because working conditions were so different in practice: thus, non-compliance with regulations was not seen as important.
In terms of workplace representation in Bulgaria, enterprises with 20 or m ore employ ees that under law are required to have committees on working conditions, had rarely established them. The widespread existence in the case studies of employment relations based on 'people you know', on loyalty or trust, and the consequent informal character of employment relations discourages compliance with legal requirem ents on both sides -by employers and employees. Social regulation based upon individual bargaining reflects the informal basis of employment relations, underpinned by personal loyalties, and coexists with employment relations based upon collective bargaining.9 Conflict res olution practices support the coexistence of both forms of regulation. For example, in the Bulgarian context violations of labour contract clauses were rarely resolved through institutional or representational channels, but rather through 'exit' or through the mobilisation of personal networks. The case studies suggest that this difference between prescription and practice is not only the result of unilateral decision-making by owners and managers. Often it is the result of mutually constructed compromises between the employer and the employees. These compromises are considered below.
Wage regulation: the dominance of individual and informal bargaining
The case studies dem onstrate that in most instances wages are paid as 'cash in hand' in order to avoid social insurance payments and to increase disposable income for employ ees, especially when, at the level of the state, social security budgets are in deficit and unable to cope effectively with risk (health, pensions, unemployment). Paying a mini mum working salary does not lead to the total avoidance of social insurance, but it helps to avoid high social insurance payments. It is common practice that, in order to reduce the social cost of employment and the am ount of income taxes paid by employees, the employer and employee agree that rem uneration be divided into two parts: the first is the minimum wage (with the obligation of social insurance and income tax payment), while the second part is not taxed but goes directly to the employees. The fact that part of the wage is paid cash in hand is not something generally imposed by the employerin the case of a Bulgarian food retail shop the m anagem ent respondent reported that it was done in cooperation with the employee. There was thus a difference between the wages stated in labour contracts and the real rem uneration received by employees. Even in medium-sized companies, such as the case study of a Bulgarian hotel, owned by an international chain, interviews showed that real salaries did not correspond to those in the labour contract as the employee respondent stated:
Only the minimal salary is written [in the contract] or a bit above the minimal. Generally, none o f the employers pays insurance on the real amount o f salary. They write smaller amounts (in order) to pay less insurance. Everywhere is like that.
In the Hungarian clothing industry, however, a wider problem was reported by a trade union leader: 'many people who contact us report delayed or unpaid salaries.'
Wage-related collective bargaining and the negotiation of minimal social insurance thresholds between social partners can, therefore, only partially influence this individu alised bargaining process, especially in sectors where the collective bargaining coverage is very low -such as retail, hotels and catering or ICT in the case of Bulgaria. Wage lev els and structure (part paid officially and part paid unofficially) in general depend on the sector of activity and the size of the company, with informal practices tending to be more frequent in small companies. Wage formation mechanisms in Bulgaria appeared obscure in some of the case examined, for example in small shops, and mediated by the 'proximity' of employees to the owners and managers. Only in some medium-sized enterprises owned by foreign investors or managers (for example, in the hotels and catering, and the chemical sectors in Bulgaria) did we observe more transparent wage formation mechanisms and perform ance-related pay based upon individual or team working. Bonus systems, while existing, often also seemed to be obscure and dependent on employer prerogative, but also sometimes informed by friendship/family relations with the employees.
Working time and working conditions
The case studies suggest that SMEs only partially observe labour legislation on working time. All of the owners and managers interviewed showed some acquaintance with the legislation. However, typical for these firms, despite some sectoral differences, is the informal organisation of work, including the regulation of working time. External envi ronm ental factors, primarily the process of deregulation, define the relatively 'liberal' right of the employers to determ ine the working time of their business, for example, in retail.
Flexibility of working time is extremely im portant for both actors in 'negotiations'. 'Longer working hours are among the three most often violated labour standards in Bulgarian SMEs during the post-communist transition, together with "work without a labour contract" and the "minimum working salary to avoid high social insurance pay m ents'" (E uropean Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (2001:1) . Similarly in Hungary it has been reported that employees sometimes worked such hours in exchange for extra pay but more often in the hope that it would facilitate career development or in return for flexibility in working hours (in ICT and retail).
The case studies show that, depending on the sector or business activity, the employer might ask employees to work longer hours, during the weekend or national holidays, or, in tourism, during high season. In smaller case study organisations these longer working hours were not paid. Employees sometimes worked such hours in 'exchange' for extra pay (in larger enterprises), but more often in the hope that it would facilitate career development or in return for flexibility in working hours (in ICT and retail). In the ICT company case studies in Bulgaria employees accepted that they would stay until late when it was necessary, in return they could take 'emergency' leave whenever they want ed to, as long as the m anager was informed. The impact of such individual bargaining power based on personal relations in small firms could be interpreted as providing more freedom and flexibility both to the employer and employees. In exchange for longer working hours the owners and m anagers give the employee m ore flexibility over work ing time, enabling them to take time off for domestic emergencies or for personal busi ness. However, from another perspective that informality might be seen as limiting the freedom of the employee to refuse extra work if asked to carry it out. In the case of a Bulgarian ICT company working time schedules were governed by external factors; employees could start work at any point in the period between 8.30 and 10.00 am and finish between 6.30 and 7.30 pm; each was free to allocate their own time as long as they fulfilled their working responsibilities (see also Alves et al., in A further mismatch between labour legislation and employment practice in SMEs can be found in the length and regularity of rest periods, breaks and annual leave, which again are informally regulated.
The other domain for informal negotiation, at least in some SMEs, is health and safety. These 'negotiated' arrangem ents are built on the basis of mutually acceptable solutions, which could differ from what is prescribed by law. In general, compliance with labour legislation depends on the size of the company; the bigger the firm, the stricter the implementation of health and safety practices. The case studies dem onstrated that in the micro and the small firms the level of health and safety observation is not rigorous. In those firms it appeared that neither employers nor employees were interested in health and safety. In Bulgaria, the recently introduced provision for the regular medical exam ination of employees is problematic, because the Labour Medicine Offices (LMOs) have no financial incentive to sign contracts with SMEs (due to the small num ber of employees). In small companies health and safety committees rarely exist. In medium sized companies, committees on Health and Safety Conditions formally exist in many cases but generally are not active (in some cases not functioning at all). One exception, illustrated in both the Bulgarian and the Hungarian case studies, are the subcontracting companies working for foreign contractors, who are keener to develop health and safe ty policies and measures under pressure from their contractors. However, even in these cases the observation of legislation might exist in theory rather than practice (for exam ple, the company might have a contract with an LMO, but it was unclear whether m ed ical examinations of personnel were actually carried out). According to the owners and managers interviewed in one of the Bulgarian case studies, they lack information from the authorities about health and safety requirem ents. Most of the respondents (exclud ing a case study in a larger hotel) agreed that the government programmes and legal initiatives were unclear and difficult to understand and adopt by employers, because of the investment they required.
Vocational training is rarely an issue addressed by Bulgarian SMEs. Evidence from the National Statistics Institute (NSI) survey on continuous vocational training (CVT) in Bulgaria showed that few hours are spent on training, particularly in micro and small enterprises; few resources are allocated to training activities and very few enterprises have a written plan and specific budget for CVT. The lack of formal training was borne out by the case studies, with the exception of initial on-the-job training. In Bulgaria there was no accredited training in any of the case study organisations, except in a tourism company, which followed the standards of an international chain. In another case -a clothing company in Bulgaria, experienced workers were asked to train the new comers. In a num ber of the case studies self-generated training was a strategy adopted by the employees, not only prior to joining the firm, but also whilst working there.
Representation
In the majority of firms studied in Hungary and Bulgaria it appeared that both owners and employers and employees preferred the 'informal regulation' of employment rel ations. In the IC T cases examined in Bulgaria a m anager insisted on the fact that: Highly qualified employees have strong negotiating power and they do not need a medi ator to communicate with the manager.
It should be noted that the extremely fast development of SMEs in the emerging m ar ket economies in central and eastern Europe did not allow the social and economic actors to focus on building an institutional framework in the sector. Economic and social policy-makers were m ore interested in m odernisation based on foreign direct invest m ent (as was the case in Hungary) or on struggles over property ownership (as was the case in Bulgaria) and the development of the SME sector received peripheral attention. Goss has proposed a typology of managerial control, based upon a combination of two dimensions: the 'extent of employers' economic dependence upon employees' and the 'ability of employees to resist the exercise of the owners' prerogative' (Goss 1991) . In the H ungarian case studies size was significant in shaping patterns of control, but was only one factor. In a num ber of cases employment relations were more formalised and codi fied, the growth of these organisations led to the increasing complexity of relationships between owners and managers, and employees, which required the use of new, stan dardised m anagem ent tools to organise work and facilitate social consent (the changes arising from increased formalisation are discussed in M oore et al., in this issue). The case studies also draw attention to the growing importance of the outsourcing of non core activities. In a small Hungarian clothing company with six employees, four employ ees worked in the company factory and the other two employees were employed as home workers. In the new economy -for example ICT -there appears to be a move towards m ore formal m anagem ent models. The case study of a Hungarian interactive media company shows that during a period of growth the owners hired an organisation al consultant. In cooperation with an international audit firm the company tried to cre ate a more efficient organisational model, first implementing separate cost centres, and later introducing project-based work organisation. In some sectors there was low awareness of trade unions. The employees interviewed in the Bulgarian hotel did not know whether a trade union for those working in tourism existed. The same was true for employees working for a clothing company. This evi dence suggests that there is a deficit in communication between trade unions and employees in small companies.
The Hungarian company case studies also indicate low awareness of unions or a per ception that there was no need for them. Yet the absence of official institutions of labour relations does not mean a lack of social consent between the actors involved in the labour process. In other words, we have to stress the informality of employment rel ations and the rather paternalistic pattern of m anagem ent in the firms surveyed. The case studies indicated that the intention of owners and managers of small firms to indi vidualise employment relationships also appeared to reflect the wishes of employees. This latter phenom enon can be attributed to a preference for informality, but also to employees' lack of trust towards their trade unions. A num ber of employees, inter viewed in both Bulgarian and Hungarian SMEs, shared a negative opinion of trade The belief of those employees is that for the m om ent unions cannot do anything for them and this reflects a wider legacy. In many cases, trade unions lost their legitimacy because of their support for the social and economic reforms and their failure to address the ensuing problem of dismissals from the large enterprises during the 1990s.
Collective bargaining
In Bulgaria collective agreem ents exist for certain sectors where cases studies were located (hotels and catering, commerce and clothing). However these agreements were not reflected in the case study organisations. There was only one example of collective bargaining and this was a subcontracting company, which had been part of a former large state-owned enterprise, acquired by a Belgian multinational. The trade union organisation had been established in 2003 and its founders were about 70 workersalmost all of them members of the trade union organisation of CITUB in the former company. The trade union section of the subcontracting company is a part of the union branch of the larger company of which it was a part. It had recently signed an agreement with the executive director for the collection of m embership subscriptions (on the basis of a monthly deduction from salary) and was in the process of negotiating a collective agreement. This case study reflects the findings of the wider SMALL project, which showed that unionisation in SMEs may be inherited following the fragmentation of larg er companies (see M oore et al., in this issue) and underlines the importance of preserv ing a trade union presence in externalised activities of large enterprises. None of the H ungarian case studies were covered by collective bargaining.
Conclusions and policy recommendations
In the cases of Bulgaria and Hungary, as in many C EE countries, SMEs are not covered by collective labour agreem ents and representative structures rarely exist. This repre sents a challenge for both social partners (trade unions and employers' organisations). Yet, the case study evidence of the SMALL project raises the question whether the SME sector is a priority for trade unions in CEECs. In Bulgaria and Hungary trade union rep resentatives interviewed for the project complained that access to workers in SMEs was difficult; at the same time workers reported that in many cases they had not heard about trade union attem pts to gain access to them.
However the problem of access and formal representation in the companies not only reflects trade union strategies, but also depends on the extent to which both employers and workers can be 'convinced' of the utility of social dialogue and the development of a culture of dialogue in general. Small businesses in CEECs are relatively new and their characteristics have a specific impact on employment relations. The possibility of col lective mobilisation was underm ined by individual strategies of survival, characteristic of the post-socialist economies, namely informal practices and secondary employment. Trade unions have responded to the problem of avoidance of regulation by SME employers (e.g. payment of minimum wages, lack of labour contracts) at national level, for example through the compulsory registration of labour contracts in Bulgaria and the introduction of minimal thresholds for representation.
However, there has been little activity at workplace level. In any case, the absence of for mal channels of representation in the SMEs hides the existence of a num ber of com promises between employers and employees over m atters such as wages, working time or health and safety conditions. Trade union action should be based on a clear under standing of these social realities. In addition, we have to stress the absence of a m ean ingful regional dimension in the labour relations systems in the form er state-socialist economies. It may be necessary to rethink the existing sectoral approach to social dia logue and to combine this with a regional perspective. In this regard the CEECs could draw upon effective regionally based labour relations systems as exist in Italy.
A more 'reflective capacity' highlighting the differences and parallels between SMEs and the public sector and m ultinational companies could provide a better articulation of the representation of employees and better adaptation of appropriate organisational strategies. In the post-communist reality individual strategies for survival have under mined collective action; the history of unions' support for liberalisation after the fall of communism and their failure to address the associated attacks on workers' job security and living conditions have m eant that unions have lost their legitimacy. They are now struggling to recruit and represent these same people now working in SMEs.
